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Be Part of Privatization?
Barbara  W. Lee
Employee participation has grown rapidly in many developed
countries, but it is only beginniniig  to emerge as an element in the
econonmies  of developing nations.  Evidence shows that em-
ployee ownership and other fomis of emiployee  participation can
eatse privatization.
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Employce  participation  in the  financial  and  employee  ownership  or  prolit  sharing  with  some
managerial  aspects  of  linns  has  inicreased  ,as  direct  participation  produces  a positive  impact  on
govenmnents  and  owners  have  tried  to enhanice  firm  performrace.  Under  privatization,  by
productiv;ty,  bro.  'en  ownership,  or  f:acilitate  contrast,  there  is no  evidence  that  employee
privatization  transactions.  ownership  alone  will  contribute  to improved
perfonnance.
Many  developed  countries  are  experiencing
rapid  growlh  in  schemes  to introduce  or  enhatice  Employee  ownership  and  other  forms  of
various  fonns  of employee  participation.  For  participation  do  appeal  to ease  privatization.
example,  about  11,000  firms  employing  11  Employee  ownership  provides  a sense  of  security
million  workers  in the  United  States  have  some  to employees  that  tlhe risk  of  redundancy  in  the
form  of  stock  ownership  for  employees.  About  firm  after  privatization  will  be  Iess.  As  a result,
10 percent  of  all  employees  in the  U.K.  are  the  opposition  of  labor  may  decrease.
eligible  to participate  in  share  ownership  plans.
Wlicrc  layoffs  do  occur  after  privatization,
An estimated  500,000  employee  profit-  share  ownerslhip  may  complement  a severance
sharing  plans  exist  in the  U.S.,  and  participatory  package.  Share  ownership  also  may  mute
plan3  are  a major  element  in  the  industrial  policy  worker  opposition  to  privatization  in those
of  such  countries  as Japan  and  Sweden.  In  countries  wlhere  employees  bclieve  that  they
developing  countries,  plans  for  employec  partici-  have  some  right  to ownership  in  the  firm,
pation  have  emerged  only  recently.  Drimariiy  in sociallist  and  post-communist
countrics.
The  effect  of employee  participation
schemes  on  firm  performance  is mixed.  Without
privatization,  evidence  is strong  that  combining
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I.  INTRODUCTION
Employee  participation  in financial  and  managerial  aspects  of the
firm,  long on the  fringes  of  debate,  has recently  moved into  the  forefront  of
policy  discussion. Schemes  to introduce  or enhance  employee  participation
have  become  a large  presence  in the  industrial  sectors  of  many developed
countries:  11,000  firms  (with  11  million  workers)  in the  U.S. have some  form
of stock  ownership  program  for  employeesl 10X  of all  employees  in the  UK are
eligible  to participate  in a share  ownership  scheme 2; some  500,000  profit
sharing  plans  exist  in the  U.S. 3; and  participatory  schemes  are a  major
emphasis  of industrial  policy  in  countries  such  as Japan  and  Sweden.' In
developing  countries,  efforts  along  these  lines  have  only recently  emerged,
most frequently  in  the context  of privatization. 5 With little  track  record,
there  are  few  guidelines  for  the  applicability  of existing  schemes  to the
developing  country  context,  together  with or in the  absence  of privatization.
The  purpose  of this  paper  is to shed  light  on the  applicability  issues  by
examining  the  general  record  of employee  participation  to date (with  emphasis
on employee  ownership); reviewing  specific  examples  of such schemes  being
proposed  and  implemented  in conjunction  wl.th  privatization;  and  weighing  the
utility  of employee  participation  schemes  in  Bank lending  operations.
Employee  participation  has  been introduced  to fulfill  an array  of
objectives. Among  them  are:  (i)  enhancing  productivity,  (ii)  avoiding
enterprise  bankruptcy,  (iii)  broadening  the  distribution  of  ownership  and  (iv)
facilitating  privatization  transactionis.  Participation  schemes  have  also  been
implemented  under  a  variety  of  guises,  for  instance,  employee  ownership  share
plans  (ESOPs),  employee  owned  firms,  profit  sharing  plans,  worker  councils,
quality  circles,  and the  like.  This  proliferation  of objectives  and
mechanisms  has led  to some  confusion  concerning  what these  schemes  are  and
what they  can  accomplish. This  paper  begins  by addressing  these  issues.
1.  The  Washington  Post (Business  Section),  October  12,  1990.
2. Blanchflower  and  Oswald  (1987),  pg.  2.
3. See  Blasi  in  Blinder  (1990).
4.  See  Levine  and  Tyson  in  Blinder  (1990).
5. There is  scant evidence of  any form of  employee ownership predating
privatization.  In a search  conducted  for  USAID,  only  six  enterprises  were
identified  in Thailand,  Zimbabwe  and  Costa  Rica (see  Goldmark,  1984).-2 -
rhe  second  queetion  concerns  what types  of schemes  have  been
implemented  or are  being  considered  for  adoption  in conjunction  with
privatization. To this  end,  we cite  examples  from  several  countries  and
enterprises  in  order  to provide  a sample  of the types  of schemes,  the  context
in  which they  are  being  proposed  and  implemented,  and  what they are  expected
to accomplish. From this  evidence,  criteria  for  implementation  will be
suggested.
II.  WHAT IS EMPLOYEE  PARTICIPATION?
There  are three  basic  types  of employee  participation: employee
ownership,  profit  sharing  and  worker  participation  in decision-making.  All
three  involve  employees  in the  financial  or decision  making  aspects  of the
enterprise. Most of the  known  examples  of employee  participation  exist  in
developed  countries  and  were not introduced  in  a privatization  context.
Nevertheless,  this  stock  of examples  provides  a  useful  taxonomy  for  discussing
the  privatization  case in later  sections.
Emp1ovee  Ownershi,
Employee  ownership  means  broadly  that  employees  own  equity  in the
firms  of their  employ,  and  thus  have  the rights  and obligations  of any typical
shareholder.  There  are  numerous  types  of employee  ownership  schemes.
Ownership  can  be direct,  where  employees  possess  tradable  shares  of the  firm,
or indirect  where  the  employee-owned  equity  is held in  a fund  or trust  with
accounts  for  each  of the  individual  employees. Ownership  by em;loyees  can
range  in amount  from less  than  1Z to 1002;  the  latter  is referred  to  as an
employee-owned  firm.
Employee  ownership  can  be opened  to all,  or only some  employees  in the
firm. Management  buyouts  (MBO)  are  an extreme  example  of restricting  those
employees  allowed  to  become  owners. MBOs  may,  however,  be combined  with a
more  broad-based  employee  share  distribution  scheme. Another  form  of limiting
ownership  is  when an original  group  of employees  purchases  a firm  and
subsequent  new employees  are  employed  as regular  contract  workers  (rather  than
permitted  to  be share  owners). Finally,  a firm  may require  that  an employee
has reached  a certain  age,  or has  worked  a specified  number  of years  in the
firm  before  being  eligible  for  share  ownership.
Most frequently,  the  right  to be an employee  owner  ends  at retirement  or
termination  and  only  then.  In other  words,  many schemes  function  such  that
employee  shares  may not  be traded  in  until  the  employee  leaves  the  firm,  and
then  at predetermined  rates. This  is generally  the  case  when shares  in the
firm  are  all  privately  held (not  publicly  tradeable),  and redeemed  shares  are
then sold  to new employees  or repurchased  by the  enterprise.  In some  cases,
employees  may sell  their  ehares  at any  time,  including  after  their  retirement.-3-
Generally,  payment  for  redeemed  shares  occurs  over  a period  ot time,  eg five
years  *.
Financing  arrangements  for  employee  purchases  of stock  fall  into  three
categoriess giveawvYs,  leveraged,  and  non-leveraged. Giveaways,  which
account  for  only  a  bmall  percentage,  have  occurred  almost  exclusively  in small
privately-owned  enterprises  at the  behest  of a retiring  (often  founding)
owner. In these  cases,  the firm  frequently  becomes  completely  employee-
owned;  employees  and  managars  alike  become  shareholders  and  professional
management  is retained. Alternatively,  giveaways  can  be a component  of the
privatization  of state-owned  enterprises  (SOEs)  where a  (usually  nominal)
percentage  of shares  are  given  to employees  by the government. Leveraging  the
enterprise  to borrow  from  financial  institutions  is  a  more common  practice;  in
this  case  the firm,  or ESOP,  makes  payments  on behalf  of its  employees  for
debt  repayment. With  ESOPs,  equity  then  accrues  in individual  accounts  for
each  employee. Leveraging  may be combined  with some start-up  capital  provided
by the  employees  themselves,  however,  it is  most ofter.  used as a  method  to
create  employee  owned  shares  at  no personal  cost  to employees. Finally,  non-
leveraged  buyouts  occur  when employees  do one  or a combination  of three
things: finance  the  purchase  out of  personal  savings,  find  loan  guarantors
other  than  using  the  value  of the  enterprise  as collateral,  or receive  loans
provided  by  the  government.
The  shares  sold  to employees  are  not  necessarily  equivalent  to
other  sh.&res  in the  enterprise. For instance,  they  may be priced  and  bought
for  less than  assessed  value in  order  to encourage,  or facilitate,  the
purchase. Discounts  on employee  purchases  of enterprise  shares  can  be offered
for  ideological  reasons  (Eastern  Europe),  to reduce  employee  opposition  to the
privatization  (Korea),  or simply  to  make the  shares  affordable  to  wage earners
(Jamaica).  Another  variation  is  when shares  initially  offered  for  sale -r-
simply  undervalued  relative  to an assessment  of the firm. This  has repo.  y
occurred  in  Malaysia,  where  shares  are  said  to be heavily  underpriced  in  v.  er
to entice  purchasers  (primarily  management)  with the  promise  of quick  capital
gains.
Employee  shares  may also  vary regarding  voting  rights. It is
reported  that 702  of U.S.  ESOP stock  has  voting  rights  attached--but  these  may
be restricted  or otherwise  not exercised  and 302  have no  voting  rights.
Voting  rights  often  differ  depending  on if  the  enterprise  is  privately  held or
publicly  traded. In the latter  case,  employees  holding  employer  securities  in
individual  accounts  have  voting  rights  according  to the  amount  of securities
6.  Valuation,  particularly  with regard  to the  employee  component,  continues
to  be a  persistent  problem. The  U.S.  Dept.  of  Labor  has  reportedly  been  working
for 14 years  to establish  appropriate  procedures  for  valuing  a  firm (and  thus
justifying  a certain level  of tax deductions)  during  the creation  of ESOPs.
Because  leveraged  ESOPs  create  such  debt  for  the  firm,  the  Dept.  is  now arguing
that employee  owned shares  should  be valued  lower  than  unleveraged  (privately
purchased)  shares. See  Washington  Post,  1990.-4-
accrued. In  privately  held  companies,  voting  rights  to employee  shareholders
is required  only  on "major  corporate  issues"'
Employee  shares  may also  differ  from  other  shares  in terms  of
ownership  privileges  such  as dividend  payment  policies,  and  the  like.  The  most
common  restriction  is the  employees'  lack  of freedom  to sell  their  shares  at
any time  to anyone. Many plans  have some  lock-in  mechanism,  such  that
employee  shares  may  be sold  only  when the  employee  leaves  the  firm.  Other
schemes  stipulate  that  dividend  payments  must be paid to  a fund  collectable
upon  departure  from  the  firm.
Typically,  however,  employee  ownership  of shares  is endowed  with
the traditional  bundle  of share  ownership  rights: the  risktaking  involved
with the fluctuating  valve  of the  equity;  the  possibility  to convert  the
equity  to cash (albeit  in some  restricted  fashion)?  the  potential  for  return
(dividends)  on the  equity;  and  some  power  to influence  corporate  policy  with
the  voting  rights  attached  to the  equity.
Examples  of employee  ownership  in  a non-privatization  context  are
found  primarily  in the  U.S. and  western  Europe. ESOPs'  in  the  U.S. and  U.K.
are frequently  cited  as having  a triad  of objecti^es: to  broaden  the
ownership  base,  stimulats  investment  and  improve  performance. As there  are
major tax  advantages  assigned  to these  plans',  they  have  become  quite  popular
in these  two  countries. They do  not,  however,  represent  a  significant  vehicle
for employee  influence  within  the  enterprise;  the  typical  U.S.  ESOP owns
7.  According  to the ESOP  Association  handbook:  "These  issues  are defined  as
merger  or  consolidation,  recapitalization,  reclassification,  liquidation,
dissolution,  sale  of substantially  all  of the  assets  of a trade  or business  of
the  corporation  and ...  similar  issues- On other  matters,  such  as  the  election
of the  board  of Directors,  the  shares  may  be voted  by the  designated  fiduciary
unless  the plan  otherwise  provides." ESOP  Association,  1990.
8. ESOP  is  used  here in  the  generic  sense  of  a defined  contribution  plan;  there
are many hybrids of these plans with technical (often tax and financial)
distinctions.  Other  employee  benefit  plans,  such  as  retirement  funds  (or  defined
benefit  plan),  may also  share  some  ESOP  characteristics.  The interested  reader
is referrQd  to Conte and Svejnar  in Blinder (1990),  Rosen (1987,  1988)  and
Quarrey,  Blasi  and  Rosen (1986)  and  ESOP  Association  (1990).
9. Both  principal  and interest  on  ESOP loan  payments  (as  opposed  to simply  the
interest  on other  commercial  loans)  are  tax  deductible.  U.S.  ESOPs  also  possess
a  number  of other  tax  benefits  (see  Conte  and  Svejnar). Conte  and  Svejnar  argue,
however, that ESOPs are not necessarily  an inexpensive  source  of corporate
finance!  and, in fact,  only a fraction  (give  number  and source)  of U.S.  ESOPs
are  leveraged.-5-
approximately  102  of the  enterprises'  shares.'"  A more extensive  form  of
employee  ownership  are  employee  owned  firms. Small  samples  of these  can  be
found  in  many OECD zountries. In these  firms,  frequently  the  enterprise  was
either  given  to employeces  by a former  owner  or  was purchased  by the  employees
during  bankruptcy  proceedings. These  firms  generally  do  not involve  much
employee  participttior  in  management  or decision-making,  unlike  the
partnership  and  employee  owned  firms  in service  and  professional  sectors  such
as law  and  accounting. Finally,  a more id&  logically  based  form  of employee
ownership  are  worker  cooperatives,  such  as chose  found  in the  construction
industry  in Italy,  the  plywood  industry  in che  northwest  U.S.  or the
industrial  cooperative  group  of  Mondragon  in Spain. Many of these  involve
more active  roles  for  the  employee  owners.
Profit  Sharing
Prof  it sharing  is an employee  incentive  scheme"  tied  directly  to
the  financial  performance  of the  firm.  In its  generic  form,  profit  sharing  is
a bonus  paid to employees  on top  of a normal  salary;  the  bonus  fluctuates
depending  on the  annual  profitability  of the  firm.' 2 Profit  sharing  may be
individually  or collectively  based,  and  may  be immee4ate  (cash-based)  or
deferred.
Many profit  sharing  schemes  resemble  employee  ownership  schemes  in
that they  are  deferred  pa-ments.' 3 In this  case,  all  profits  accrued  to an
individual  are  placed  in  a trust,  or individual  account,  and  can  be taken  into
10.  As  calculated  by  the  General  Accounting  Office,  reported  in  Conte  and  Svejnar
(Ibid).
11. Bonus payments  may be similar  to profit  sharing.  When conditions  for
receiving  bonuses  are stated  in the  employmn-nm  contract,  these  bonuses  can be
considered  incentive  payments. The  numerous  e  -4ples  of  bonus  schemes  that  are
not incentive  payments  (for  instance,  many ext. Give  programs  in the U.S. and
the bonus system  in Japan--covering  some 20% of total  wage payments  for all
Japanese  workers)  will not be discussed  here.  Fir more information  on the
Japanese  case,  see  Hashimoto  in  Blinder  (1990).
12.  The hybrids  of profit  sharing  vary depending  on how and  when the  bonus is
paid.  One  variation,  frequently  called  gainsharing,  is  derived  from  a  calculation
of output  gains  or cost  reduction  (rather  than  financial  profitability).  Note
that  all  of these  programs  pay these  bonuses  on top  of regular  salaries,  which
is  vastly  different  from  the  renowne"  form  of  profit  sharing  proposed  by  Weitzman
(1984)  where  the total  wage package  would be based  on firm  performance.
13.  Blasi,  in  Blinder  (1990),  gives  evidence  that  96%  of  the  profit  sharing  plans
in  the  U.S.  are  deferred  and  therefore  resemble  ESOPs. In  addition,  many  profit
sharing  plans  invest  in  shares  of  their  own  enterprise  (some  solely),  making  them
nearly  indistinguishable  from  ESOPs.possession  only  upon  the  employee's  departure  from the  firm.  However,  unlike
employee  ownership,  there  are  no assets  owned  by individuals  and  no bundle  of
rights  associated  with assets. In additi.n,  profit  sharing,  unlike  employee
ownership  which frequently  has  a  combinauion  of objectives,  is  almost
exclusively  employed  as a  performance  incentive; linking  pay to performance
is considered  & way to  motivate  employees  to produce  more and  better.
Profit  sharing  exists  both  as a legislated  policy  (standardized
for  an entire  economy)  and  as a  more custom-made  enterprise  policy. In
France,  for  instance,  a decree  was adopted  in 1967  introducing  an obligatory
system  of deferred  profit  sharing  in all  enterprises  employing  more than 100
workers (Uvalhc,  1989). The  scheme  calls  for  a certain  percent  of profits
based  on an explicit  formula  reflecting  increases  in labor  productivity  to  be
allocated  to a fund  for  employees. This is  frozen  for  the  first  five  years,
after  which cash  convertability  is permitted. A variety  of tax exemptions
make these  schemes  advantageous  to  both the  individual  and the  firms. France
also  enjoys  generous  tax  exemptions  on immediate  cash-based  profit  sharing,
which is  not obligatory. Similarly,  most OECD  countries  have  experienced  a
recent  proliferation  of enterprises  voluntarily  introducing  profit  sharing
plans,  which  are frequently  deferred  for  tax  reasons.
Participation  in  Decision  Making
Employee  participation  in  decision  making  is a  mechanism  to
empower  the  employee  with  more control  and influence  over the  substance  &.dlor
environment  of his  work.  Participatory  schemes  were originally  introduced  for
ideological  reasons--frequently  in lieu  of  wage increases--and  since  have  been
institutionalizeJ  in a  number  of (western  European)  countries  where there  are
powerful  labor  unions. More  recently,  participatory  schemes  have  been
introduced  with the  hopes  of improving  employee  productivity. The  theoretical
basis  for  this  notion  is not  only  that  employees  will  be stimulated  by having
more control  over  their  work lives,  but  also  that  they frequently  possess
specialized  knowledge  of production  activities  that  can  be harnessed  in a
systematic  way."
Participation  can  be limited,  i.e.  concerning  day-to-day
production  decisions  or comprehensive  influencing  longer  term  financial
decisions  such  as  wage and investment  policies. Forms  of  participation  vary
widely,  ranging  from "grassroots"  or direct  participation  to formal  employee
involvement  in the  established  decision  making  institutions  in an enterprise,
14. The arguments  to counter this are:  that employees  will make selfish
decisions  that  will  undermine  firm  profitability;  and  that  the  transaction  costs
or  monitoring  costs  stemming  from  involving  employees  in  decision  making  outweigh
the  potential  productivity  gains.  (See  Levine  ant.  Tyson,  in Blinder  1990  for
a further  elaboration  of these  arguments.)which  is  indirect  or  r.preentativ.. 1'  Generally,  there  is  a  correlation
between  limited  and  direct  participation  on  the  one  hand,  and  comprehensive
and  representative  on  the  other.  Some  examples  of  these  forms  include:
(i)  Quality  circles  (QC)  --  intended  to  be  a form  of  information
sharing  about  how  to  improve  the  quality  of  production;  QCs  are
(often  voluntary)  groups  focussed  on  specific  techniques  or
products.  Information  sharing  is  assumed  tc  be  motivated  by  the
employees'  ambition  to  accomplish  good  work  and  produce  a  good
product.
(ii) Team  production  techniques  --  designed  as  a  departure  from  the
automated  &seembly  line  ty>r  of  production,  to  allow  workers
variety  in  their  jobs  and  more  flexibility  in  how  they  are
performed.
(iii)  Employee  seats  on  Board  of  Directors  --  found  primarily  in  western
Europe,  where  one  or  two  seats  on  the  Boards  of  Directors  of
enterprises  are  designated  for  representatives  of  unions  or  other
employee  organizations.
(iv) Workers'  councils  --  found  primarily  in  socialist  economies,  where
employee  representative  groups  take  many  decisions  assigned  to
management  in  western  economies.
A summary  of  the  characteristics  of  the  three  types  of  employee
participation  is  shown  below  in  Tabl 3ne.
15. Levine and  Tyson distinguish  three categories  of  participation:
consultative,  where  employees  are  allowed  or encouraged  o  give  opinions  but
final decisions  are made by management;  substantive,  involving  direct
participation  where employui  suggestions  about production  techniques  are
frequently  implemented;  and representative,  intended  for advisorial  or
information  purposes  on  managerial  issues.-8-
,abl.  One
Employee  Profit  Participation  in
OnershiD  Sharina  Decision  Makinx
Obi  e.tives
Broadening  ownership  Yes  No  No
Increase  productivity  Yes  Yes  Yes
Facilitate  privatization  Yes  No  F.-
Rescue  non-viable  firm  Yes  No  No
Egalitarian/ideological
reasons  Sometimes  Infrequently  Sometimes
Features
Share  ownership  Yes  No  No
Potential  dividend  payments  Yes  No  No
Voting  Rights  Sometimes  No  Sometimes
Participation/consultation  Yes-in  represen-
in  managerial  decisions  Not typical  No  tative  schemes
Participation/consultation  Not  explicitly  No  Yes-in  direct




Coverage  in e-iterprise  Varies  Usuallv  100%  Varies
Government  incentives  Tax  incentives  Tax  Some  forms
to promote  schemes  in  many  incentives  legislated  in
countries  if income  some  countries
is deferred-9-
III.  COSTS  AND BENEFITf  OF EHPLOYEE  PARTICIPATION
Employee  participation  affects  a variety  of arenas,  for
instanLe,  political,  social,  economic  and  financ-l.  Many of the  political
and social  implications  (e.g.  broadening  ownership  or increasing  employee
satisfaction)  and ideological  grounds  (increasing  the  power  of the  working
class)  are  difficult  to formalize  or have  not  been systematically  assessee
There  are  also  macroeconomic  effects,  such  as those  on government  revenue
Tax revenues,  for  example,  are  contingent  upon  the specific  tax ''igislation
accompanying  the  different  types  of schemes,  and  revenue  may be lost  during
privatizations  due to free  or discounted  shares.  The costs  and  benefits  of
these  participatory  schemec  discussed  below  focus  on financial  and  efficiency-
related  issues.
Efficiency
A comron  argument  for  any form  of employee  participation  is  a
purported  increase  in labor  productivity  and  operational  efficiency."
However,  the  theoretical  literature  leaves  unresolved  the links  between
employee  participation  and  produc-:.vity.  On the  one  hand is the  argument  that
employee  participation  will increase  productivity.  This  occurs  through  three
sources:  the  productive  skills  of the  labor  force;  workers'  effort  or
iiitensity  of  work; and  the  firm's  organizational  efficiency. Better
management-employee  relations  and  greater  job  satisfaction  can reduce  la or
turnover.  as  will employees'  financial  commitment  to the  firm.  Less turnover
(an  applauded  feature  of the  Japanese  system)  implies  a build-up  of firm
specific  human  capital,  and  commaiXwent  can  stimulate  the  information  flow  and
on-the-job  training,  all  improving  the  skills  of the  labor  force. Increased
effort  or  work intensity  -an  stem  from  a  variety  of sources,  eg loyalty  or
commitment,  and  direct  pecuniary  incentives  like  profit  sharing. Finally,
organizational  efficiency  can  be encouraged  by reduced  supervision  and
expedited  information  processing,  greater  cooperation,  few3r  strikes,  etc.
On the  other  hand,  the  very same  arguments  have  been  employed  to
arrive  at the opposite  conclusion. Collective  ownership  is  said to encourage
the  free  rider  effect  and  thus  reduce  effort  and  labor  produntivity.  Managers
will not be able to  efficiently  carry  out  their  decisions  due  to interference
by  worker  participation.  And  participation  may hamper  factor  mobilbty. In
the  case  of capital,  this  may retard  investment,  and  in the  case  of labor  it
may  make employment  termination  or new  hiring  difficult.
16.  The arguments  and  evidence  presented  below  draw  heavily  on Blinder  (1990)
and  Lee (1989).-10-
A recent  flow  of empirical  data  on all  three  forms  of
participation  mirrors  the  unresolved  theoretical  debate  that  has  been  boiling
for  years;  the evidence  on the  productivity  effects  of employee  participation
is  mixed.  The  evidence  stems  from  numerous  studies  and  indicates  that,  at a
minimum,  employee  participation  has  no negative  effects  on productivity  (ie,
it is efficiency  neutral)  and  in the  best case  participation  may be efficiency
enhancing. The  most conclusive  evidence  concerns  profit  sharing,  where there
is convincing  evidence  to support  its  positive  contribution  to  productivity.
Partici  .tion  in  decision  making,  when exercised  a':  the  grassroots  level
rather  than  by representation,  is also  suggested  to be efficiency  enhancing.
Employee  ownership  per se (tested  in both  ESOP firms  and completely  employee
owned  firms)  yields  no conclusive  results. Finally,  it is  becoming  clear  from
the sum  of the  evidence  that  financial  incentives  (both  ownership  and  profit
sharing)  are  most effective  when combined  with shopfloor  level
participation."1
Financial
The  most pronounced  impact  of employee  ownership  and  profit
sharing  is on individual  employee  income  and  wealth.  Shares  offered  at
discounts  or other  premiums  with no lock-in  mechanism  (frequently  sold  after  a
short  period),  individual  cash-based  profit  sharing  schemes,  and  dividend
yielding  share  ownership  contribute  directly  to employee  income. Since  these
benefits  are  almost  exclusively  on top  of regular  wages,  they  will raise  total
income. Deferred  share  ownership  and  profit  sharing  schemes  contribute  to the
potential  wealth  of the  employee.
The impact  on the  firm  is also  considerable.  For instance,  the
method  of financing  employee  ownership  will affect  the  capitalization  of the
firm. Leveraging  the  firm  and  purchasing  treasury  stock  will provide  fresh
financing  for  new investments.  Moreover,  if  the lender  is a commercial
financial  institution,  there  could  be a  positive  effect  on the financial
discipline  of the firm. However,  if the  lender  is the  government,  the
potential  exists  that  the  enterprise  will perceive  this  as a softening  of the
budget  constraint." 8 Finally,  if the  ESOP is financed  (even  partially)  by the
17. A  related question is in what types of firms are these schemes  most
successful. Both empirical  (Lee,  1989)  and  anecdotal  (see  the example  of NFC
below)  evidence  indicates  that  the  size  of the  enterprise  plays  no role  in the
efficiency  effects  of these  schemes. Further,  there  is  no evidence  linking  type
of production  or sector  to this  question,  other  than nagging  suspicions  that
service  industries  and industries  with high white-collar  concentrations  may
facilitate  the implementation  (if  not enhance  the  efficiency)  of these  schemes
which explains  the  abundance  of these  schemes  in  professional  sectors.
18.  The question  of who provides  the financing  can be an important  factor  in
providing  correct incentives.  Government  financing  often occurs for social
reasons,  implying  that  the  government  has a vested  interent  in the success  of
the  firm. It is  possible  that  the  government  would  more  readily  relax  interest-11-
employees  themselves,  there  is the  risk  of personal  loss if the  enterprise
fails.  (The  threat  of this  could  put  a damper  on financial  risk  taking  and
thus  stifle  long  term  profitab_lity.)
Another  issue  concerns  the  price  of shares  purchased  by employees.
If the  shares  are given  away,  they  are  made readily  available  to low  income
(or  non  risktaking)  employees. However,  there  is  a genuine  concern  that  no
real  sense  of ownership  will be developed. Selling  the  shares  at a discount
encourages  speculation  and  thus  accelerates  turnover  of shares  (assuming  there
is  no lock-in  mechanism). Both  giveaways  and  discounts  have the  effect  of
reducing  potential  revenue  intake  for  the  government  if sold  during  a
privatization. On the other  hand,  fully  priced  shares  may have the
disadvantage  of being  too  dear  for  non-salaried  employees.
Other  costs  of participation  are  labor-related,  including
potential  loss  of  work time,  wage escalation,  and  retention  of an
inappropriate  work force. Any form  of employee  participation  in  decision
making,  despite  purported  productivity  increases,  will detract  from  time  on
the  job.  In addition,  employee  participation  in  more substantive  decisions
can  cause  a conflict  of interest. Employees  can  block  wage discussions  or,  in
the  worst  case,  cast  majority  votes  for  unjustified  wage increases  to the
detriment  of the  firm's  profitability. (The  latter  case  has been  observed  in
Yugoslavia,  China  and  Laos,  where  employee  decision  making  predominates  over
any  profit  making  interests  that  the  state  -as  owner  - may  have).  In the long
run, preference  for  wage increases  or dividend  payments  over  new investments
may jeopardize  the  viability  of the  firm.  Employees  may also  vote against  any
measures  to downsize  staff  and  in the  case  of employee  ownership  may also
block  new hires  in  order  to retain  greater  share  holdings. Finally,  all  these
schemes  involve  some transaction  costs:  calculating  bonuses  for  profit-
sharing  programs,  loan repayment  schedules  for  ESOPs  and  administering
conLiltations  in participatory  schemes.
Some  of the  outcomes  of employee  participation  are  presented  in
Table  Two  below.
and  principal  payments  or,  in  the  extreme  case,  bail  out  a loss  making  firm  even
after  it  has  been  privatized.  Further,  management  may  work under  the  assumption
that  bailouts  will occur.-12-
Table  Two
Employee  Profit  Participation  in
Ownership  Sharing  Decision  Making
Outcomes
Immediate  income  above/  Sometimes
beyond  wages  (dividend  Sometimes  No
payments)
Deferred  income  or  wealth  Yes  Sometimes  No
above/beyond  wages  (equity  sales)
Increased  productivity  No conclusive  Yes  More likely
evidence*  from  direct/less
likely  from
representative
Decreased  productivity  No evidence  No evidence  No evidence
Likelihood  of negative  No evidence;  Unlikely  Less likely  with
impact  on  management  can  be cor-  direct;  more




Broadened  ownership  Yes in short  No  No
run,  but long
run  effects
may be  marginal
Shopfloor  (direct)  participation  coupled  with employee  ownership
increases  the  likelihood  of productivity  gains.-13-
IV.  EXAMPLES  OF EMPLOYEE  OWNERSHIP  IN PRIVATIZATION
Two categories  of employee  ownership  introduced  during
privatization  have  been  identified: schemes  legislated  to  be introduced
during  the  privatization  of entire  SOE sectors,  and  those  which  are a
component  of the  privatization  of individual  firms. The former  is represented
in countries  which  have or are  implementing  such  schemes  (U.K.,  France,  Korea,
Argentina  and  Poland" 9), and  those  with schemes  under  consideration  (Sri
Lanka) 20. The  enterprise  examples  are  far  more numerous;  those  chosen  for
illustrative  purposes  for  this study  are  the  National  Freight  Corporation
(U.K.)  and the  National  Commercial  Bank (Jamaica). Snapshots  of these
privatization  examples  are  provided  below.
SOE  Sectors
U.K.
One of the  major  themes  of the  Thatcher  privatization  program  was
to create  a nation  of shareholders.  Small  scale  ownership,  including  employee
ownership,  was encouraged. In some  cases,  direct  incentives  or other  special
arrangements  were offered  by the  government  to achieve  this  end. 2'  Management
buyouts  were also  encouraged. Ten  enterprises,  or almost  half  of all
privately  sold firm,  were sold  as  NBOs.  At least  one  of the  MBOs --National
Freight--  was  purchased  by a  management-employee  consortia.
Employee  ownership  was  encouraged  by the  government  through  a
program  of free  and  matching  shares. During  each  of the initial  offerings  of
the  enterprises  sold  publicly,  employees  were offered  a  number  of free  shares
(on  average,  approximately  40).  Purchases  made  by employees  were  matched  with
19.  Chile  reportedly  incorporated  employee  ownership  into its final phase  of
privatization;  of 17  fully  privatized  enterprises,  3  ended  up as 100%  employee-
owned  while the remaining  had an average  of 20%  worker ownership  (and 7% in
another  nine partially  privatized  firms). Substantial  employee  representation
on the  Board  of  Directors  was also  a feature  of this  program,  which  apparently
has been  widely  praised.
20.  Pakistan  is  also  reported  to  be  considering  an  employee  ownership  stipulation
in  coming  privatizations,  but  details  are  unavailable.
21. Installment  payments (payments  for stock purchase spread out over 2-3
payments  and  over several  months),  and  loyalty  bonuses  (where  additional  stock
or some  other  bonus  is awarded  if stock  is  held  for  a specified  period  of time)
are  two  of  the  innovations  granted  small  scale  purchasers.  Much  of this  section
relies  heavily  on Hyman  in  Veljanovski  (1989).-14-
a number  of shares  (often  2:1).  In all  of these  offerings,  shares  were
designated  and reserved  for  employees  and  pensioners  in case  of
oversubscription  (with  a ceiling  on individual  purchases  and  on total  employee
purchases  --  10%  in the  largest  case). Nearly  80%  of employees  on average
took  advantage  of these  offerings.
All free  and  matching  shares  were locked-in  to an ESOP,  presumably
with no allowances  for  sale  until  the  employee's  departure  from  the  firm.  The
shares  purchased  by the  employees  themselves  were,  however,  available  for
immediate  sale,  and  because  of the  market  premium  many at once took  advantage
of this  option. In cases  where  purchases  were  made in installments,  bonuses
(eg,  discounts  on purchases  of additional  shares)  were awarded  to those
retaining  shares  up until  the last  installment  was  paid (to  reduce  the
temptation  for  quick  turnover  and  profit  taking). With the  exception  of
National  Freight,  no firm  ended  up  with more than  4% employee  ownership. 22
France
The  French  privatizations  share  many features  of those  in the  U.K.
The  underlying  political  goal  was to divest  the  state  of previously
nationalized  firms  while  creating  some  form  of "popular  capitalism". To this
end,  there  were,  as in  the  UK case,  ample  provisions  for  small  scale  and
employee  ownership.
In  all SOE  privatizations,  the  government  reserved  10%  of shares
for  employee  purchases;  with few  exceptions  this  quota  was oversubscribed  (50-
90% of employees  invested). Some  early  privatizations  in 1982  were less than
successful  in developing  broad  employee  ownership,  as the  ratio  of shares
purchased  by executives  was extremely  high  and  shares  were bought  primarily
for speculative  reasons  and sold  soon  thereafter.  However,  in 1986  a
framework  was developed  such  that  all  privatizations  would  follow  a specified
formula: 60% to French  nationals  (including  a maximum  10%  to past  and present
employees);  20-30%  to a core  group  of institutional  investors;  and  20% in
private  placement.
The  government  permitted  preferential  terms  for  employee
purchases. These  included  installment  payments,  some  free  shares,  some
reductions  (up  to 20%)  on issue  price (with  the  stipulation  that those  shares
offered  at a reduction  of greater  than 5%  were locked-in  for  two  years),  and
matching  shares  (one  for  one,  with a lock-in  of one  year).  (Santini,  1988)
The  outcome  has also  been similar  to Britain;  there  has been  a considerable
amount  of share  turnover  subsequent  to privatization  but significant  increases
of employee  and  small  scale  owners  relative  to the  pre-privatization  period.
Korea
The on-going  privatization  program  in  Korea  involves  the  partial
(49X)  divestiture  of seven  large  SOEs.  Two firms  have already  been divested.
The divestiture  is intended  to increase  equality  of income  distribution  and
22.  According  to Hyman  in  Veljanovski  (1989).-15-
ownership  in  the economy  as  a  whole and  efficiency,  with emphasis  on the
former  (the  enterprises  are  already  performing  well).  The  main component  of
the  program  is the  People's  Share  Program,  which allows  the  purchase  of 752  of
shares  by low income  individuals  and  202  by employees.
The  employee  package  was conceived  to  reduce  opposition  to
privatization,  which  would  purportedly  stem from  the  fear  of employment
reductions. The 20%  reserved  for  employees  translates  to a per  employee
allocation  100  times  greater  than  that  for  the  average  private  individual.
One  of two  forms  of preferential  pricing  can  be exploited  for  employee
purchases: a 30%  discount  on the  issue  price,  or installment  payments  of up
to 5 years,  interest  free.  In order  to lock  in,  a guaranteed  dividend  is
offered  to all  long  term  shareholders. In one  of the  companies  already
divested,  employees  received  preferential  financing  in addition  to discounts
(on  the  condition  that  shares  were locked-in  until  retirement). The  post-
privatization  employee  ownership  block  was approximately  102.
Argentina,  Poland  and  Sri  Lanka
Legislation  has recently  been  passed  in  both  Argentina  and  Poland
which stipulates  employee  ownership  to be introduced  during  privatization. In
addition,  Sri  Lanka  is  considering  employee  ownership  as a component  in
proposed  privatization. These  three  countries  will be briefly  discussed
below.
The  Argentinian  privatization  program  includes  employee  ownership
as a  way to introduce  "democracy"  into  both  political  and  economic  realms.
The  Programa  de Propiedad  Participada  (PPPt  specifically  requires  that  102  of
a  privatized  company's  stock  go to its  employees. Although  no privatizations
have  yet been  transacted  under  PPP,  the  legislation  encourages  an ESOP  type  of
arrangement. Employees  would  not be required  to participate  in the  program,
however,  they  would  not  have to  make a financial  contribution  in order  to
become  shareholders.  The employee  shares  would  be  priced  at market  value  but
financed  by the  enterprise  over  a  period  of time.  Payments  for these  shares
will be transferred  to the  government. During  the  transition  period  prior  to
employees'  full  ownership  of their  shares,  the  employee  block  of shares  will
be placed  in  a trust  with a  designated  fiduciary. After  full  payment,  the
shares  will be dispersed  to the individual  employees. The  Program  also
provides  such  details  as a formula  to determine  the  number  of shares  which  can
be allocated  to each  worker,  and  the  requirement  for  establishing  a  guarantee
fund  which  will repurchase  employee  shares  upon  departure.
The  Polish  employee  ownership  component  is a part  of the  "mass"
privatization  program  aimed  at transferring  enterprise  shares  to a  variety  of
interest  groups. This  program  will cover  approximately  500  large  enterprises
and  will involve  the  free  distribution  of a large  portion  of their  shares. In
addition  to  blocks  of shares  being  transferred  to the  public  at large,  pension
funds  and  bar.ks,  102  will be reserved  for  enterprise  employees. The
legislation  is flexible  on the form  of employee  ownership. While  no
transactions  have  been completed,  at least  one  large  enterprise  is actively
designing  an ESOP to  meet the  requirements.-16-
Sri  Lanka's  state  owned  enterprise  sector  is slated  for  widespread
reform. Due to the  highly  political  nature  of the  SOEs,  and the  privileges
and  conflicting  objectives  which  have  been  bestowed  upon  them,  it is  widely
perceived  that  corporatization,  or the  transformation  of SOEs into  joint  stock
companies,  followed  by restructuring  and  finally  privatization  ("peoplization"
is the  actual  term  used  by the  government)  is the  only realistic  method  of
reform. This  will involve  two  different  and  separate  aspects  of employee
involvement: "gratuities"  and  eventually  employee  shares.
Gratuities  are  not  directly  related  to employee  ownership  or
profit  sharing;  they  resemble  more  a severance  payment  on the termination  of
employees'  civil  service  status  during  a privatization. There  is,  however,
some speculation  that some  of these  gratuities  paid in the  form  of bonds  may
be converted  into  employee  owned  shares  during  the  privatization  phase.
Employee  ownership  is  being  enthusiastically  discussed  by the  populist
government,  but a concrete  program  has  yet to emerge. Legislation  has  not
been  passed,  but it is  assumed  that  approximately  102  of SOE shares  will be
reserved  for  employees. The  government's  enthusiasm  does not,  however,  seem
to be shared  by employees. Many  of the  SOEs  have records  of poor  performance,
all  too  well known  to their  employees,  who are  reported  to  be less  than
interested  in investing  in such  firms.
Enterprises
National  Freight Consortium,  U.K.
As a detailed  example,  the  experience  of the  National  Freight  Co.
represents  the type  of success  story  that  employee  ownership  advocates  enjoy
flaunting. In 1982,  due to a combination  of economic  circumstances  which
prevented  a public  offering,  the  company  was purchased  by a consortium  of its
employees,  orchestrated  by key  management  personnel. The  method  of  purchase
and financing  was  meticulously  planned,  and the  campaigns  to include  employees
of all levels  as owners  have  been immensely  successful. Shares  have increased
in  value  by 62 times,  and  profits  have increased  by over 12  times  since  the
buyout. Also,  both investments  and  dividends  have  increased  considerably.
Much of the  successful  performance  has  been  attributed  to employee/sharaholder
commitment,  although  there  have  reportedly  been  some  financial  transactions
undertaken  since  employee  ownership  which  have contributed  significantly  to
profitability.
At the  time  of purchase,  the  firm  had  some 42,000  potential
purchasers  (24,000  current  and 18,000  retired  employees). Approximately  one-
fourth  of these  purchased  shares  at the  time  of the  original  offer,  and  some
6,000  additional  employees  made invertments  in subsequent  years (Thompson,
1985). Eighty-three  percent  of the  equity  is presently  held  by these
shareholders,  with the  remaining  belonging  to the  lending  institutions.
The  majority  of the financing  for the  original  purchase  was
through  leveraging. A fund  was established  to  provide  interest-free  loans  to
employees  for stock  purchase. These  loans  are  still  provided  for  share
purchase  by new  employees,  whose 'entry  price'  remains  affordable  due  to a-17-
policy  of share  splitting. Shares  are  tradable  only on an internal  market  on
designated  dealing  days.  The  value  of shares  is established  by an independent
auditing  firm,  and  transactions  are  prioritized  according  to the  category  of
purchaser  and seller  (trustees  of deceased  employees,  those  in financial
hardship,  and such). Oversubscription  has  occurred  at each  sale.
Employee  involvement,  combined  with professional  management,  is
very  much the  philosophy  of the  firm.  In addition  to  broadbased  ownership
within  the  firm,  including  frequent  opportunities  to exercise  voting  rights,
th%  firm  has  a number  of programs  supporting  the idea  that  effort  should  be
rewarded. This is accomplished  through  a  variety  of bonus  schemes. Employee
interest  and  commitment  in the  firm  is a  key  component.  Programs  to sustain
interest  and  commitment  include  regional  quarterly  shareholder  meetings,
shareholder  surveys,  newsletters  and  the  like.  NFC  appears  to  be a good
example  of a "participatory  management"  style.
National  Commercial  Bank,  Jamaica
The  National  Commercial  Bank  was the  flagship  privatization  in
Jamaica,  undertaken  with the  clear  idea  of involving  as  many nationals  as
possible  in the  purchase  of  enterprise  shares. Employee  ownership  was very
much  a  part of the  government's  ideological  position; employees  were to  be
given  a stake  in the  firms  of their  employ  in order  to enhance  personal
motivation  and  to establish  a broad  base for  the  ownership  of assets  (Leeds,
1988).
A prospectus  was produced  which  outlined  the  mechanism  for
employee  purchases  of shares. Of the  51S  of the shares  offered  for  sale,  132
were reserved  for  employees. 23 All fulltime  employees  were eligible  for  a
combination  of free  shares,  matching  shares  and  purchased  shares  (both
discounted  and full-priced)  up to a  ceiling  of 2070 shares. The 13S  of shares
were initially  reserved  in a trust,  to  which  employees  applied  for  ownership.
The shares  under  the  stewardship  of the  trust  were financed  by a loan  made by
the  Bank  itself  (ie,  leveraging),  which  was repaid  in  cash or installments  by
employee  purchasers. The  installment  plan,  called  the  Easy  Payment  Plan,
enabled  employees  to  pay for  shares  through  salary  deductions  over  a 24  month
period. Approximately  982  of eligible  employees  participated  in the  offering.
All unsold  shares  remained  in the  trust  for  a second  round  of
offering  to the  employees,  again  at a discounted  although  slightly  less
preferential  rate.  In the  second  round  of offerings,  the  ceiling  for
individual  purchases  was raised  to  50,000  shares. Payment  arrangements  were
23.  The 13Z  reserved  for  employees  became  an instant  voting  block  as the 492
of shares  remaining  in government  hands  were declared  non-voting  shares. The
Trust  holding  all  employee  owned  shares  has reportedly  since  bought  up shares
on the open market, and has had major influence  on, among  other things,  the
choice of Directors.  Whether or not this has had any effect on diverting
enterprise  objectives  away from profit  maximization  has not been confirmed;
however,  the risks  are  apparent.-18-
similar  to the first  round. Of the  four  categories  of shares",  the free
share6t  were not tradable  within  the  first  two  years. The  matching  and
discounted  shares  sare tradable  only  to other  employees  (iL,  internal  trading
within  the  Trust)  and  only  priority  shares  were freely  tradable, The free,
matching  and discounted  shares  reportedly  cos. :he  government  approximately
J$L.2  million.
Sumaarv  of ExAmoles
The examples  above  illustrate  that  employee  ownership  Was
implemented  as part of  privatization  for  a  variety  of political,  social,
financial  and  economic  objectives.  While insufficient  time  has  elapsed  to
make thorough  asaessments  of the  outcomes,  a few  noteworthy  features  can  be
highlighted.
Objectives: The  employee  ownership  component  of these  privatizations  had
clear  political  aims.  Broadening  share  ownership  was the  primary  objective;
and  employee  ownership  was often  coupled  with efforts  to stimulate  other  small
scale  ownership. Employee  ownership  was also  described  as a necessary
component  to facilitate  the  privatization.  Clearly  there  was  a perceived  or
real  threat  of labor  opposition  to the  privatization. Equally  important,
although  less  often  expressed,  was a desire  on the  part of the  government  to
leave  intact  the  managerial  staff  during  the  transaction. Share  :fferings
were seen  as a method  to retain  these  employees  at least  in the  short  run.
Finally,  employee  satisfaction,  improvement  of labor-management  relations,  and
raising  employee  productivity  were recognized  as important  aspects  of some  of
the  employee  ownership  components.
Extent:  Employee  ownership  as a privatization  component  in  the
transformation  of an entire  SOE  sector  is  often  kept to nominal  values. Five
to ten  percent  of any  given  firm  was the figure  most frequently  employed.
This appears  to  be a compromise  figure: large  enough  to reduce  potential
labor  opposition  yet  small  enough  not  to give  employees  too  much influence
over  managerial  decision  making. It is important  to  point  out,  however,  that
if the  government  retains  a certain  percentage  of shares,  and remains  a
passive  (as  in NCB)  or benevolent  (as  in  Korea)  owner,  the employee  block
could  gain real influence. Moreover,  there  is the  potential  that  the  employee
block,  particularly  when retained  collectively  in a trust,  can increase  its
shareholdings  to become  a decisive  fL:ce  in the  firm.  The  risk that
objectives  other  than  profit  making  become  predominant,  ultimately  affecting
firm  performance,  are  thus increased.
More extensive  employee  ownership  (such  as that  in NFC),
particularly  when coupled  with other  participatory  plans,  a.e  usually  designed
24. The categories  of shares  were offered  in a "step  approach",  whereby  free
shares  were allocated  first,  then  purchased  and  matched  shares,  only  then  could
employees  purchase  discounted  shares,  and  finally  priority  shares. The  employee
could advance  to the next category  only after purchasing  the  maximum of the
previous  category.-19-
on a  case-by-case  basis,  rather  than  sector-wide. This is  a  transaction  cost-
intensive  undertaking.  The  trade-off  is  that  greater  amounts  of  employee
ownership  tend  to  be  more  sustainablel  this  assists  in  maintaining  a  broader
ownership  within  the  economy  and  also  disecourages  speculative  ownership.  In
addition,  there  may  be  greater  efficiency  gains  possible  in  firms  adopting
more  extensive  employee  ownership.
Mechanismss  Two  inte:esting  and  useful  features  employed  in  implementing
employee  ownership  components  were  brought  out  in  these  examples.  First  Is
the  method  of  finance.  For  the  employee  block  as  a  whole,  this  was  ofton  done
by  leveraging  or  through  government  guarantees.  For  the  shares  purchased  by
individuals,  there  were  incentives  such  as  installment  payvents,  interest  free
loans,  discounts,  giveaways,  and  matching  shares.  There  is  no  doubt  that
these  incentives  (or  a  combination  of  them--the  step  approach  being
particularly  enticing)  increased  the  appeal  of  share  purchase  to  employees.
Second,  there  is  the  prevalent  feature  of  lock-ins.  Lock-ins  were
either  mandatory,  ranging  from  one  year  to  the  full  period  of  employment,  or
voluntary,  often  with  some  bonus  attached.  Many  of  the  governments  sent  out
conflicting  signals  with  their  advertising  of  privatization  programs.  On  the
one  hand,  shares  were  priced  at  a  premium  (clearly  the  case  for  those  free  sr
discounted  shares  designated  for  employees)  and  potential  revenues  from  the
sales  of  shares  were  made  no  secret.  As  a  consequence,  many  of  the  employees
sold  their  shares  for  quick  cash  gains  soon  after  purchase.  On  the  other
hand,  the  creation  of  a  sustainable  broader  ownership  base  appeared  to  be  a
high  governmental  priority,  implying  that  these  new  owners  should  not  sell,
but  in  fact  should  hold  onto  their  new  shares.  Lock-ins  were  an  effective
compromise.
V.  ASSFISMENT
What  Can  Emolove.  ParticinatLon  Accomplish?
The  answer  to  the  question  raised  above  is  clearly  related  to  the
context  of  employee  participation,  i.e.  during  privatization  or  in  the  absence
of  privatization,  as  the  context  determines  the  objectives.  Where
privatization  is  not  the  context,  employee  participation  schemes  have
frequently  been  implemented  either  for  political  or  ideological  reasons,  to
increase  the  rights  or  wealth  of  employees  and  broaden  ownership  or  as  a
motivational  incentive  intended  to  improve  enterprise  performance.  Where
privatization  is the  goal,  additional  objectives  include  decreasing  labor
opposition  to  the  privatization,  retaining  competent  management,  and  possibly
rescuing  bankrupt  firms. Can employee  participation  schemes  achieve  any of
these  objectives?  And  if  so,  which  types  of  participation  schemes  perform
best?
Employee  ownership  appears  to  contribute  to  the  broadening  of
share  ownership  at  the  macro  level.  Evidence  from  the  U.S.  General  Accounting-20-
Office  suggests  that  per capita  stock  owner  hip  via ESOPs  waS three  times  that
of the  U.S.  average.A  Evidence  from  the  U.K.  and  France  indicates
considerable  increases  in post-privatization  ownership  due  to the  employee
ownership  plans  and  other  small-scale  owner  incentive  packages. However,  the
sustainability  of this  phenomena  is  positively  related  to lock-in
stipulations,  and  negatively  related  to attractive  premiums  on issue  price.
Lock-ins,  while  justified  in privately  held firms,  can  be a questionable
mechanism  because  they  may create  share  market  distortions  for shares  of
publicly  traded  firms.  They  may be easier  to  justify  with employee,  as opposed
to general,  buyers  as the  lock-in  can  be tied to the  employees'  tenure  in the
firm.
Is employee  ownership  the  best  way to broaden  ownership  in a
privatizing  economy? Clearly  a public  offering  has  greater  potential
coverage,  but  does  not  necessarily  deliver  a dispersed  purchasing  group.  In
order  to entice  low/middle  income  buyers,  governments  will target  certain
groups  such  as pensioners  or low  income  citizens  often  with discounted  shares.
Employees  are  then  only  one of several  target  groups  needed  to  broaden
ownership. Further,  an argument  raised  frequently  in the  eastern  European
context  is that  utilizing  only  employee  ownership  to broaden  the  ownership
base is inequitable; it  rewards  only  those  who are  employed  in  profitable
firms  at the  cost  of those  employed  in the  private  sector,  in  poorly
performing  firms,  in government  service  sectors,  and  the  unemployed. It is
clear  that  employees  should  be coupled  with other  purchasing  groups  to best
achieve  this  goal.
The effect  of employee  participation  schemes  on firm  performance
is  mixed.  In the  non-pi 4vatization  context,  the  evidence  is quite  strong  that
combining  employee  ownership  or profit  sharing  together  with some form  of
direct  (non-representative)  participation  produces  a  positive  impact  on firm
performance.  But,  so far,  this  combination  of schemes  has  not been  considered
in the  privatization  context,  with the  exception  of NFC.  Since  there  is
little  outcome  data  on  most of the  privatizations  reported  above,  and  since
the  employee  ownership  component  in  many privatization  cases  was relatively
small,  there  is  no evidence  that  employee  ownership  alone  will contribute  to
performance  improvements  in the  privatization  context.
Employee  ownership  may  have an impact  on corporate  governance. On
the  one  hand,  it  can  concentrate  ownership  within  an enterprise,  which can  be
advantageous  to SOEs suffering  from  a lack  of clear  ownership. On the  other
hand,  powerful  employee  voting  blocks  may interfere  in  management  decision
making  or  press  for  objectives  other  than  profit  making,  which  can  negatively
affect  firm  performance  in  the short  run  and  threaten  enterprise  viability  in
the  long run. Limiting  the  voting  rights  of employee-owned  shares  or creating
a buffer  by placing  employee-owned  shares  in a fund  with a designated
fiduciary  are  ways of reducing  the likelihood  of this  usurption  of power  by
employees.
25.  There is,  however,  a  concentration  of managerment  ownership  in  many ESOPs.-21-
Employee  ownership,  and  oth;r  forms  of participat.ons  do however,
appear  to  be advantageous  in facilitating  privatizations.  First,  employee
ownership  provides  a sense  of security  to employees  that  the risk  of
redundancy  in the  post-privatization  firm  will  be reduced;  consequently
labor's  opposition  can  be reduced. Where  there  are  post-privatization
layoffs,  share  ownership  may com;lement  a severance  package.  Second,  share
ownership  mutes  worker  oprositica.  to  privatization  in those  countries  where
employees  have  been led  to believe  that they  have some  right  to ownership  in
the  firm.  (This  is true  primarily  in socialist  and  post-communist  countries.)
The eventual  windfall  profit  offered  many  employees  due  to  the  advantageous
purchase  conditions  may  make privatization  seem  more attractive. Purthert  it
may also  have  the  effect  of  persuading  key  management  personnel  to stay  on
during  the  transition.
Finally,  complete  employee  ownership  as a  method  to rescue  a non-
viable  firm  is a tenucus  proposition.  If costs  can  be cut  by reducing  the
cadre  of  middle  management  and  redundant  employees2-',  if employees  agree  to
sacrifice  some  of their  wages during  the  turnaround  period,  and if employees
can increase  their  productivity  *.n  the  hope that  the  rewards  of increased
productivity  will directly  accrue  to them,  there  is  potential  for  a  successful
turnaround.  While  this  has  been accomplished  in some  cases  in  developed
countries,  it  is a rare  combination  of circumstances  which  leads  to success.
Relevance  for  Bank  Borrowers
General
Employee  ownership  introduced  in conjunction  with privatization  is
a  relatively  new  and rare  phenomenon. In developing  countries,  there  are  very
few  examples. However,  it  is  precisely  in the  context  of privatization  in
developing  countries  that  employee  participation  is beginning  to  be discussed
and to emerge. One  clear  message  which  stems  from  the  preceding  discussion  is
that the  objectives  for introducing  employee  ownership  must be clarified  and
prioritized  in order  to establish  if employee  participation  is  an appropriate
component  of a  privatization  program. In  addition,  objectives  for  the
employee  participation  component  must also  be considered  in relation  to the
objectives  of the  privatization  as a  whole.  For insta.,ce,  if a  primary
objective  of privatization  is  to raise  revenues  for  the  state,  then the  cost
of giveaways,  discounts  and  other  forms  of premiums  must  be calculated. If
one objective  is to retain  a high  level  of domestic  ownership  during  a
privatization,  then a greater  ratio  of employee  ownership,  and  its  attendant
costs,  might  be considered.
What can  be gleaned  from  the  experience  to date  of countries  and
eaterprises,  both developed  and  developing  indicate  that  employee
26.  Some  of the  most publicized  examples  of  bankruptcy  takeovers  involve  groups
of  workers  determined  to  manage  the  firm  themselves. This ambition  frequently
results  in dire financial  consequences  for  the firm.-22-
participation  may  be  a  useful  component  of  privatization  In  the  following
cases
- To  broaden  the  distribution  of  ownership  during  privatization,
employee  chars  offering.  have  some  effect.  Purchase  incentives  are
usually  necessary,  and  lock-in  mechanisms  leod  to  greater
custainability.  Employee  purchases  generally  are  cheaper  to
administer  than  a  public  offering,  but  do  not  have  the  same  coverage.
Thus,  to  moet  this  objective,  employee  ownership  has  typically  been
combined  with  share  offerings  to  other  small  scale  purchaser  groups
such as  pensioners.  The  amount  of  employee  ownership  offered  during
privatization*  aimed  at  broadening  share  ownerahip  has  been  in  the
range  of  5-202.
- Performance  improvements  have  not  been  unequivocally  linked  to
employee  ownership  alone.  There  is  evidence  that  profit  sharing  does
lead  to  incroesed  productivity  as  may  employee  ownership  combined
with  schemes  to  involve  employees  in  shop  floor  decision  making.
However,  since  profit  sharing  is  not  & mechanism  easily  combined  with
privatization,  employee  ownership  coupled  with  some  participation  in
decision  making  may be  a  second  best  solution  to  bolster
productivity.
- To facilitate  the  privatization  transaction,  the  record  indicates
that  small  amounts  of  employee  ownership  (e.g.  52)  may suffice.  This
has  traditionally  been  accompanied  by  large  premiums  on  the  issue
price,  generous  financing  arrangements  and  no  lock-in  mechanism.
- To  restructure  a  weak  but  potentially  viable  firm,  employee  ownership
is  recommended only  where  there  is  no  question  of  a  bailout,  where  at
least  some of  the  workers"  capital  is  used  for  financing,  and  where
some employee  participation  in  decision  making  under  the  guidance  of
professional  management  is  introduced' 7
There  is  no  single  recipe  for  an  optimal  set  of  characteristics  (e.g.
dividend  policies,  voting  rights,  direct  08  Indirect  holdings  and  the  like)  or
mechanisms  (e.g.  discounted  or  matching  shares,  lock-ins)  for  an  employee
participation  scheme.  Evidence  is  only  beginning  to  emerge  concerning  how the
different  characteristics  and  mechanisms  enhance  the  various  objectives  set
out  for  these  schemes.  Regarding  the  extent  of  the  schemes,  it  is  clear  that
too  little  (for  instance,  less  than  52  share  ownership)  may have  no  effect  in
order  to  achieve  objectives.  In  contrast,  too  much participation  (for
instance,  in  comprehensive  decision  making)  may end  up being  detrimental  to
the  enterprise.  Regarding  the  kind  of  employee  participation,  some basic
27.  In  poorly  performing  or  nearly  bankrupt  firms  with  a potential  for  salvaging,
a  sensible  approach  would  be  to  introduce  profit  sharing  and  limited
participation  (such  as  teamwork)  during  the  restructuring  phase  to  judge  the
responsiveness  of  employees.  If  the  schemes  are  successful  in  raising
productivity,  employee  ownership  might  then  be  considered  during  privatization.-23-
lessons  are  beginning  to  emerge.  For  broadening  ownership,  employee  ownership
is  the  only  alternative  of  the  three  types  of  employee  participation. T For
increasing  productivity,  financial  rewards  and  decision  making  participation
should  be  introduced  simultaneously.  (Thie  is  equally  true  for  SOEs  being
privatized  as  those  remaining  state-owned.)  To  facilitate  the  privatization,
only  ownership  hae  been  tried  and  appears  successful.  While  employee
ownership  is  far  superior  to  employment  uaarantees  for  reducing  employee
opposition  to  privatization,  other  forms  of  participation  may  prove  to  be
equally  good  substitutes.
Socialist  Economies  in  TrasiLtion
The  special  case  of  economies  transforming  from  coin'nd  to  market
systems  provides  a  clear  case  for  the  use  of  employee  participation  as  a
privatization  component.  First,  these  economies  need  to  jumpetart  private
ownership  with  a  vdriety  of  transferral  methods.  Second,  employee  ownership
may  be  a  necessary  condition  in  some  countries,  as  employees  perceive  that
they  already  have  certain  (ill  defined)  ownership  right.  In  their  enterprises.
In  all  cases  however,  employee  ownership  should  be  treated  ae  only  one  of  a
menu of  privatization  options.  This  is  particularly  Important  due  to  the
large  number  of  potentially  non-viable  enterprises;  employee  ownership  in  the
enterprises  could  cause  severe  social  equity  problems.
Legislation  is  being  introduced  in  many  reforming  socialist  countries
to  provide  for  employee  ownership.  In  some cases,  new laws  allowing  employees
to  purchase  their  own firms  have  resulted  in  what  has  been  dubbed  *spontaneous
privatization",  where  management more  or  less  confiscates  the  assets  of  formr
SOEj for  personal  gains.  In  the  case  of  Hungary,  however,  this  process  is  now
being  carefully  monitored.  In  other  cases,  notably  Poland.  legislation  has
been  passed  stipulating  a  percentage  of  employee  ownership  during
privatization.  Finally,  in  Yugoslavia  the  transformation  of  80Bs  to  employee
owned firms  is  being  encouraged.""
Economies  in  transition  provide  a  unique  Instance  of  privatisation  as
an  end  unto  itself.  With  the  pressure  to  privatize  a  vast  number  of
enterprises  quickly,  employee  ownership  becomes  an  attractive  technique  to
forward  the  privatization  process.  Over  and  beyond  Its  role  to  broaden
ownership,  as  seen  in  the  cases  described  above,  perhap&  the  strongest
argument  for  the  use  of  employee  ownership  is  as  a  short  to  medium  term
measure  to  deepen  private  ownership  in  transforming  economies.  In  addition,
the  implementation  of  employee  ownership  can  reduce  administrative  time  and
costs  and  ease  political  conflicto,  relative  to  other  forms  of  privatization.
28.  However,  governments  interested  in  improving  the  distribution  of income,
rather  than  wealth,  would  be  wise  to  consider  profit  sharing  schemes.
29.  In  profitable  enterprises  in  Yugoslavia,  a  share  of  employee  Income  is  to
be  regularly  deposited  into  an  ESOP-type  trust  In  order  to  eventually  purchase
the  firm. The  Law  on  Personal  Incomes,  which  stipulates  this,  is  rcportedly
being  vigorously  opposed  by  unions.  (See  Bogetic,  1990).-24-
However,  equally  important  to speed  and  cost  is that  the ownership  structure
of the  post-privatized  firm  provides  correct  incentives  for  financial
performance. Yugoslavia  is an excellent  example  where in order  for  employee
ownership  to succeed,  self-management  must  be eliminated  and  professional
management  (guided  by a Board  of Directors)  established.
What types  of enterprises  would  be best suited  for  employee  ownership
schemes? Extensive  employee  ownership  could  be introduced  into  a  variety  of
firms,  for instance,  those  that  are  service-oriented,  rely  heavily  on human
capital  or are small-scale,  labor  intensive  lines  of production. These  are
firms  where individual  output  is fairly  monitorable,  and financial  rewards  may
provide  a motivational  incentive. In addition  these  firms  could  be easily
transformed  to employee-owned  with relatively  little  risk  to employees  and
then  later  sold to outside  owners. Larger  industrial  firms  will likely  start
with a  more limited  form  of employee  ownershipg  such  as  an ESOP,  such  that
employees  become  one  of the  many groups  of investors  in the  enterprise. Firma
in need  of restructuring  could  test  profit  sharing  and  limited  participation
to  phase  out  worker  councils,  bolster  incentives  and  contribute  to a
turnaround  prior  to privatization.  Finally,  enterprises  which  have little
comme-cial  value and  are  unattractive  to investors  could  be given  to the
employees  as a last  resort  prior  to liquidation.
The lure  of potential  future  profits  for  employees  may end  up being  a
much needed  market  stimulus,  harne%aing  entrepreneurial  talent  and  stimulating
production  and  private  ownership. The  key is  to ensure  that  potential
employee  owners  understand  the  risk  of ownership,  and that  no post-
privatization  bailouts  from  the  government  are  permitted.-25-
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